

Liberals and Conservatives are Similarly Motivated to Avoid Exposure to One Another's Opinions

Supplemental Materials

Study 1

Method

Statements read by participants. Statements arguing in favor of same-sex marriage (SSM) were an edited version of those from <http://atheism.about.com/od/gaymarriage/p/ProGayMarriage.htm>. Statements arguing against SSM were an edited version of those from <http://www.tfpstudentaction.org/politically-incorrect/homosexuality/10-reasons-why-homosexual-marriage-is-harmful-and-must-be-opposed.html>.

The statements in favor of SSM were:

1. Studies repeatedly demonstrate that people who marry tend to be better off financially, emotionally, psychologically, and even medically. Marriage is not universally an improvement (women, for example, can actually be worse off in some ways), but it generally is. Because of this, it stands to reason that legalized gay marriage will ultimately prove beneficial for gay individuals.
2. Perhaps the most important aspect of marriage is that it establishes a legal and social relationship which makes it easier for people to "be there" for each other - economically, emotionally, and psychologically. Most of the rights and privileges that go with marriage are, in fact, ways to help spouses support each other. Married couples are thus much better off than unmarried couples, giving relationships the ability to grow stronger and deeper.
3. Because gays can't marry, it's very difficult for partners to help each other in difficult situations like medical crises. The burden of support and decision-making typically falls in the laps of other family members when it should fall to one's chosen life partner. If people know that they can rely upon their relative's spouse, they can be far less anxious about what will happen to their loved one - not just in the context of a crisis, but in general, too.
4. The Christian Right would deny gays the ability to adopt or raise children, but that's an impossible goal. Children are already being born to, adopted by, and raised by gay couples in increasing numbers. Children in stable, married households can be better off

than those who aren't because both parents can handle decision-making and parenting without worry. Opponents of divorce often cite the negative effects on children; the same can be said against bans on gay marriages.

5. Married couples can help and support each other in a variety of ways because laws and regulations are written to help that happen - for example, people are able to take time off to help their hospitalized spouse. Gay couples who cannot marry don't receive the same help, so much of what gay partners would do for each other must be shouldered by the community at large, unnecessarily draining resources. By solidifying relationships, gay marriage can help stabilize a community overall.
6. Conservatives who usually oppose gay marriage argue, correctly, that stable families are a cornerstone to a stable society. Families are the smallest social unit in society and trends in the family inevitably affect trends in society as a whole - and vice-versa, of course. Allowing gays to marry will help better integrate them and their relationships into society. Ensuring that gay relationships are stable and receive support will benefit the stability of society overall.
7. Opponents of gay marriage argue that it would undermine the institution of marriage, but it's hard to see how more marriages would be bad for marriage. If anything harms marriage, it is bad marriages where people don't take marriage seriously - and that's already too common with heterosexuals. If gay couples in committed relationships are able to formalize their unions as marriages, that can only serve to improve marriage overall by providing more positive role models.
8. Some opponents and supporters of gay marriage support civil unions as an alternative, but that's a mistake. For marriages to continue as a stabilizing force in society, they must be genuine marriages - not "marriage lite" that carries some benefits without all the responsibilities. Equality before the law means that creating civil unions for gays will lead to civil unions for everyone else and this "marriage lite" will be more of a threat to marriage than gay unions could possibly be.

After reading each statement, participants responded to a comprehension check: "The main point that the author is trying to make is:" Participants selected one of eight summary statements. The statements were presented in random order each time they were presented. The eight statements, in their correct order, were:

1. SSM improves the lives of gay people as individuals
2. SSM improves the lives of gay couples
3. SSM enhances the lives of families with gay members
4. SSM improves the lives of children of gay couples
5. SSM enhances the communities with gay couples
6. SSM helps stabilize society generally
7. SSM could benefit marriage generally
8. Marriage is better than civil union

The statements against SSM were:

1. Calling something marriage does not make it marriage. Marriage has always been a covenant between a man and a woman, which is by its nature ordered toward the procreation and education of children and the unity and wellbeing of the spouses. The promoters of same-sex “marriage” propose something entirely different. They propose the union between two men or two women. Two entirely different things cannot be considered the same thing.
2. Marriage is a relationship rooted in human nature and thus governed by natural law. Natural law’s most elementary precept is that “good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided.” By his natural reason, man can perceive what is morally good or bad for him. Any situation, which institutionalizes the circumvention of the purpose of the sexual act, violates natural law and the objective norm of morality.
3. It is in the child’s best interests that he be raised under the influence of his natural father and mother. This rule is confirmed by the evident difficulties faced by the many children who are orphans or are raised by a single parent, a relative, or a foster parent. The unfortunate situation of these children will be the norm for all children of a same-sex “marriage.” A child of a same-sex “marriage” will always be deprived of either his natural mother or father.
4. In the name of the “family,” same-sex “marriage” serves to validate not only such unions but the whole homosexual lifestyle in all its bisexual and transgender variants. Civil laws externally shape the life of society, but also profoundly modify everyone’s perception and evaluation of forms of behavior. Legal recognition of same-sex “marriage” would necessarily obscure certain basic moral values, devalue traditional marriage, and weaken public morality.
5. Traditional marriage is usually so fecund that those who would frustrate its end must do violence to nature to prevent the birth of children by using contraception. It naturally tends to create families. On the contrary, same-sex “marriage” is intrinsically sterile. If the “spouses” want a child, they must circumvent nature by costly and artificial means or employ surrogates. The natural tendency of such a union is not to create families. Therefore, we cannot call a same-sex union marriage and give it the benefits of true marriage.
6. One of the main reasons why the State bestows numerous benefits on marriage is that by its very nature and design, marriage provides the normal conditions for a stable, affectionate, and moral atmosphere that is beneficial to the upbringing of children—all fruit of the mutual affection of the parents. This aids in perpetuating the nation and strengthening society, an evident interest of the State. Homosexual “marriage” does not provide such conditions. Its primary purpose is the personal gratification of two individuals whose union is sterile by nature.
7. In the 1960s, society was pressured to accept all kinds of sexual relationships between men and women. Today we are seeing a new sexual revolution where society is being asked to accept sodomy and same-sex “marriage.” If homosexual “marriage” is universally accepted as the present step in sexual “freedom,” what logical arguments can be used to stop the next steps of incest, pedophilia, bestiality, and other forms of unnatural behavior?
8. Whenever one violates the natural moral order established by God, one sins and offends God. Same-sex “marriage” does just this. Accordingly, anyone who professes to love

God must be opposed to it. Marriage is not the creature of any State. Rather, it was established by God in Paradise for our first parents, Adam and Eve. The same was taught by Jesus Christ. Genesis also teaches how God punished Sodom and Gomorrah for the sin of homosexuality.

Comprehension check questions:

1. SSM is not marriage
2. SSM violates natural law
3. SSM always denies a child either a father or a mother
4. SSM validates and promotes the homosexual lifestyle
5. SSM does not create a family but a naturally sterile union
6. SSM defeats the State's purpose of benefiting marriage
7. SSM is the cutting edge of the sexual revolution
8. SSM offends god

Study 2

Knowledge Assessment

The knowledge assessment task asked participants to write down three reasons why people voted the way they did in the 2012 U.S. Presidential election. Accompanying an image of Obama (Romney) from the 2012 campaign, the instructions read:

In the 2012 Presidential Election, 66 (61) million Americans voted for Barack Obama [Democrat] (Mitt Romney [Republican]). Why did these people vote for Obama (Romney)? What sorts of things were they thinking or feeling that led them to vote for Obama (Romney)?

Three text boxes appeared below. We randomized the order of presentation between subjects (Obama/Romney).

Later, we reduced the full set of 468 responses for each Presidential candidate to 71 common themes for Obama and 77 for Romney (see Tables S1 and S2). A coder, blind to the study hypotheses, categorized each of the original responses into a single theme. To assess the inter-rater reliability, a second coder repeated the coding. Reliability was substantial, with 78% exact agreement for Obama and 68% for Romney. We explain how we managed discrepancies between the two coders below.

A new sample ($N = 153$; see Study 2b) scored how accurately each theme explained why people voted the way they did on a 13-point scale, anchored at 1 (*F*), 2 (*D-*), 3 (*D*), ... , 12 (*A*), and 13 (*A+*). The instructions for judging Romney themes read:

In the 2012 Presidential Election, 61 million Americans voted for Mitt Romney (MR for short). Here are a number of reasons that a variety of people offered for why these 61 million voters may have chosen Romney. Your task is to SCORE THE ACCURACY of these reasons. That is, how well does each one actually describe why these citizens voted for Romney? The goal here is *not* to say whether you agree or disagree with these reasons. Rather, the goal is to judge how *accurately* each of these characterize the process by which some people came to vote for Romney. Aim to be as objective as possible. Use the standard school grading scale (F to A+).

We used the judgments that Obama voters made of the reasons why people voted for Obama to derive an accuracy score ($ICC = 0.98$) and vice versa for Romney themes ($ICC = 0.98$; see Tables S1 and S2). In the case of discrepancies between the coders' assigning responses to nominal categories, we averaged the score associated with each category. Scores from the two coders converged at $r = .88$ for Obama and $r = .92$ for Romney. We then aggregated the scores from the three reasons that each participant gave for each of Obama voters' decision ($\alpha = .64$) and for Romney voters' decision ($\alpha = .72$).

Table S1. Stated reasons why people voted for Mitt Romney in the 2012 U.S. Presidential Election, along with accuracy scores/grades.

| Mitt Romney (MR) voters... | | |
|---|--------------|--------------|
| Theme | Score | Grade |
| wanted a reversal of Obama's policies | 11.57 | A |
| were disappointed with Obama & the Democrats | 11.29 | A- |
| thought that MR is competent & would do a better job | 11.24 | A- |
| thought that MR was the best choice | 11.05 | A- |
| liked MR's stance on family values | 10.90 | A- |
| thought that MR would make a strong leader | 10.88 | A- |
| thought that MR would make a good president | 10.83 | A- |
| were loyal Republicans | 10.83 | A- |
| desired conservative leadership | 10.81 | A- |
| thought that MR is an experienced, proven business leader | 10.79 | A- |
| wanted change | 10.79 | A- |

| | | |
|---|-------|----|
| liked that MR is a Republican | 10.74 | A- |
| generally agreed with MR's policies | 10.74 | A- |
| thought that MR is smart, knowledgeable, educated | 10.67 | A- |
| were committed to Republican ideals | 10.64 | A- |
| thought that MR would be good for the economy & job creation | 10.64 | A- |
| thought that MR held conservative values on moral issues | 10.62 | A- |
| believed MR | 10.57 | A- |
| believed MR's promises | 10.52 | A- |
| thought that MR had a realistic vision | 10.48 | B+ |
| thought that MR would fix the country's problems | 10.38 | B+ |
| thought that MR was pro-military & anti-terrorism | 10.33 | B+ |
| liked MR's stance on immigration | 10.33 | B+ |
| liked MR's policies on national defense | 10.33 | B+ |
| felt hope for the future | 10.27 | B+ |
| like MR's stance on health care | 10.26 | B+ |
| thought that MR has character & good ethics | 10.24 | B+ |
| wanted stability | 10.24 | B+ |
| desired lower taxes | 10.21 | B+ |
| like MR's stance on foreign policy | 10.21 | B+ |
| believed MR's speeches | 10.14 | B+ |
| wanted smaller, more efficient government & less regulation | 10.14 | B+ |
| thought that MR is honest, straightforward & trustworthy | 10.12 | B+ |
| thought that MR would strengthen the image of the US on the international scene | 10.05 | B+ |
| thought that MR has a good reputation | 10.00 | B+ |
| liked MR in general | 9.98 | B+ |
| used thought & common sense | 9.98 | B+ |
| thought that MR is a good person | 9.95 | B+ |
| liked MR's patriotism | 9.86 | B+ |
| thought that MR is kind and caring | 9.76 | B+ |
| liked MR's international diplomacy | 9.55 | B+ |
| liked MR's stance on abortion | 9.45 | B |
| wanted things to return to the way they were | 9.40 | B |
| believed that America is changing | 9.36 | B |
| felt respect | 9.29 | B |
| were religious | 9.21 | B |
| thought that MR was like them | 9.10 | B |
| thought that MR is clean | 9.00 | B |
| thought that MR had charisma & gave effective speeches | 8.81 | B |
| thought that MR would cut back on social programs | 8.39 | B- |
| thought that MR would decrease war | 8.24 | B- |
| thought that MR would lower the crime rate | 8.21 | B- |
| felt excitement | 7.83 | B- |

| | | |
|--|------|----|
| thought that MR is brave | 7.81 | B- |
| felt that they did not have enough choices | 7.02 | B |
| thought that MR offered tax breaks for the wealthy | 6.74 | B |
| thought that MR is famous | 6.64 | B |
| thought that MR is attractive | 6.40 | B- |
| felt anger and fear | 6.36 | B- |
| felt sympathy | 6.26 | B- |
| liked that MR is white | 6.10 | B- |
| like white people | 5.81 | B- |
| were elitist | 5.69 | B- |
| (I don't know) | 5.10 | C+ |
| were influenced by the effects of donations from corporate interests | 4.93 | C+ |
| disliked black people | 4.67 | C+ |
| picked randomly | 4.48 | C |
| were greed, selfish, and wanted money | 4.24 | C |
| thought that MR is arrogant | 4.19 | C |
| believed MR's lies | 4.17 | C |
| don't like to help poor people | 4.10 | C |
| made a mistake | 3.90 | C |
| felt hatred | 3.62 | C |
| were dumb, uneducated, ignorant, and brainwashed | 3.48 | D+ |
| disliked freedom | 3.02 | D+ |
| thought that MR is ugly | 2.86 | D+ |

Table S2. Stated reasons why people voted for Barack Obama in the 2012 U.S. Presidential Election, along with accuracy scores/grades.

| Barack Obama (BO) voters... | | |
|---|--------------|--------------|
| Theme | Score | Grade |
| thought that BO is smart, educated, knowledgeable | 10.95 | A- |
| had hope | 10.87 | A- |
| thought that BO would improve the economy & create jobs | 10.68 | A- |
| thought that BO is better than the alternatives | 10.68 | A- |
| thought that BO would do a good job | 10.64 | A- |
| thought that BO would advance social equality/fairness/inclusiveness | 10.64 | A- |
| thought that BO would be good for the country | 10.56 | A- |
| agreed with BO's policies | 10.51 | A- |
| thought that BO is dedicated | 10.48 | B+ |
| disliked Romney, Bush, and the Republicans | 10.45 | B+ |
| thought that BO presented himself well | 10.42 | B+ |
| thought that BO is a good, responsible leader (character & integrity) | 10.42 | B+ |
| believed in the ideas & plans BO set out | 10.41 | B+ |
| thought that BO would help/empower the poor and middle class | 10.39 | B+ |

| | | |
|---|-------|----|
| thought that BO would fix healthcare | 10.39 | B+ |
| thought that BO is calm & composed | 10.37 | B+ |
| admired & respected BO | 10.32 | B+ |
| were loyal to the Democrat party | 10.31 | B+ |
| thought that BO is a down-to-earth family man | 10.28 | B+ |
| desired a better life | 10.27 | B+ |
| thought that BO's a good speaker | 10.26 | B+ |
| thought that BO would advocate for racial minorities & improve race relations | 10.25 | B+ |
| thought that BO would reverse Bush's policies | 10.22 | B+ |
| thought that BO is inspired & confident | 10.21 | B+ |
| desired change | 10.20 | B+ |
| thought that BO is strong & influential | 10.18 | B+ |
| thought that BO is honest & trustworthy | 10.14 | B+ |
| desired peace & the end of war | 10.12 | B+ |
| thought that BO represented liberal/progressive values | 10.08 | B+ |
| thought that BO had a good first term. They desired more. | 9.95 | B+ |
| thought that BO is caring & generous | 9.95 | B+ |
| thought that BO's a nice person - warm, welcoming | 9.94 | B+ |
| desired a new, young leader | 9.91 | B+ |
| were sane | 9.90 | B+ |
| wanted stability & to stay the course | 9.90 | B+ |
| thought that BO was experienced | 9.77 | B+ |
| were proud | 9.71 | B+ |
| were socially informed & aware | 9.68 | B+ |
| were thinking long-term | 9.66 | B+ |
| thought that BO would hold big business accountable | 9.65 | B+ |
| thought that BO is popular & well-liked | 9.60 | B+ |
| thought that BO would do good things to the Supreme Court | 9.55 | B+ |
| relied on thought & reason over doctrine | 9.34 | B |
| thought that BO was the president | 9.34 | B |
| thought that BO would advance gay rights | 9.33 | B |
| felt joy & excitement | 9.24 | B |
| were patriotic | 9.08 | B |
| desired to be a part of history | 9.05 | B |
| wanted a black President | 8.83 | B |
| voted for BO because they could | 8.78 | B |
| thought that BO would lower taxes | 8.50 | B- |
| were black or from another racial minority | 8.28 | B- |
| were influenced by the media | 8.27 | B- |
| thought that BO is an entrepreneur | 7.58 | B- |
| thought that voting for BO was the cool thing to do | 7.56 | B- |
| thought that BO would limit religious groups' influence | 7.47 | C+ |

| | | |
|---|------|----|
| were from the north | 6.83 | C+ |
| felt sympathy | 6.67 | C+ |
| thought that BO represented socialism | 6.49 | C |
| felt desperate | 6.45 | C |
| thought that BO is sexy | 6.15 | C |
| were angry | 6.02 | C |
| desired entitlements & handouts | 5.69 | C |
| thought that they were of family relation to BO | 5.68 | C |
| (I don't know) | 5.41 | C- |
| picked randomly | 5.00 | C- |
| felt guilty | 4.87 | C- |
| were deceived | 4.68 | C- |
| were selfish & greedy | 4.27 | D+ |
| were stupid, ignorance, or crazy | 3.81 | D+ |

Results


If people have an impoverished understanding of their political opponents' reasoning, they should be less aware of their opponents' reasons for voting than the reasons of their allies. We predicted that there should be an interaction between candidate preference (Romney/Obama) and knowledge scores. Consistent with this hypothesis, a 2 (judge; between subjects) \times 2 (target; within subjects) mixed model ANOVA predicting knowledge scores produced the predicted interaction, $F(1, 153^1) = 70.78, p < .001, \omega^2 = .310$, and no main effects, $F_s(1, 153) \leq 2.63, p_s \geq .11, \omega^2_s \leq .010$.

Participants displayed greater knowledge of their allies' reasons for voting than their opponents' reasons. The left panel of Figure 1 shows that Obama voters received higher scores for understanding the real reasons why people voted for Obama compared to their reasons why people voted for Romney, $F(1, 153^2) = 50.27, p < .001, d = 0.91$. Similarly, Romney voters received higher scores for understanding the real reasons why people voted for Romney than for why people voted for Obama, $F(1, 153) = 28.91, p < .001, d = -1.31$.

¹ Degrees of freedom being less than expected given the sample size are due to missing data.

² We used the pooled error term when testing simple main effects.

Figure S1. Assessed knowledge of people’s reasons for voting as they did in the 2012 U.S. Presidential election. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.



Study 2b

In the previous analysis, we found that people exhibit more knowledge about their ideological allies than about their ideological opponents. In Study 2b, we tested whether people also report that they do not understand their ideological opponents. We predicted that people will admit that they feel less knowledgeable about the “other side” than they do about their own side.

Method

Sample. The American sample was the same participants that performed the scoring of responses in Study 2 ($N = 153$). On average, participants were 38 years old ($SD = 12$), and somewhat liberal ($M = -18$, $SD = 63$). The sample was 58% female and 41% male.

Procedure. Before grading the open-ended responses (see above), participants reported how knowledgeable they felt about people who voted for Obama versus Romney in the 2012 U.S. Presidential election. Finally, they provided demographic information, which included an

item about how they voted in 2012 (see Study 1; 111 voted for Obama and 42 voted for Romney).

Knowledge assessment. Participants indicated how knowledgeable they felt about people who voted in the 2012 election. The instructions read, “In the 2012 Presidential Election, 61 [66] million Americans voted for Mitt Romney (Republican) [Barack Obama (Democrat)]. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements about these 61 [66] million Americans who voted for Romney [Obama]?” Participants then indicated how much they agree with five statements ($\alpha = .83$) on a scale anchored at 0 (*strongly disagree*), 33 (*disagree*), 67 (*agree*), and 100 (*strongly agree*). The statements were as follows, with the final three reverse scored:

- I know exactly why they voted for Romney [Obama]
- If asked, I could tell you what they were thinking and feeling when they voted.
- I’m unclear about their reasons for voting Romney [Obama]
- These people are a bit of a mystery to me
- I feel confused about why they voted Romney [Obama]

The questions about Obama and Romney appeared in counterbalanced order between participants.


Results

If people feel less knowledgeable about their political opponents’ reasoning than they do about their allies, they should report being less aware of their opponents’ reasons for voting than the reasons of their allies. We predicted that there should be an interaction between candidate preference (Romney/Obama) and self-reported knowledge of reasons for voting for these candidates. Consistent with this hypothesis, a 2 (judge; between) \times 2 (target; within) mixed

model ANOVA predicting knowledge scores produced the predicted interaction, $F(1,151) = 90.20, p < .001, \omega^2 = .368$, and no main effects $F_s(1, 151) \leq 0.86, p_s \geq .36, \omega^2_s \leq .001$.

Figure S2 shows that Obama voters claimed to feel more knowledgeable about Obama voters' reasons than they felt about Romney voters' reasons for voting, $F(1,151) = 50.27, p < .001, d = 1.18$. Similarly, Romney supporters claimed to feel more knowledgeable about people who voted as they did than they did about people who voted for Obama, $F(1,151) = 28.91, p < .001, d = -1.43$.

Figure 2. People who voted for Obama and Romney in the 2012 U.S. Presidential election report knowing less about their opponents' reasons for voting than those of their ideological allies. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.



Discussion.

People readily admitted that they felt less knowledgeable about their opponents' views than those of their ideological allies. This triangulation of assessed and self-report results strongly suggests that people may be, in fact, less knowledgeable about their ideological

opponents than they are of their allies. The desire to avoid exposure to the opinions of ideological opponents is unlikely to be a reaction to already having sufficient knowledge. People do not seem to desire to fill this knowledge gap. Rather, they exhibited a motivation to remain in a state of impoverished understanding.

Study 3: Knowledge Assessment

Method

For each candidate, participants indicated how knowledgeable they felt about the candidate's supporters using the same five-item face-valid scale as in Study 2b ($\alpha = .84$).

Results

2016 U.S. presidential election. We predicted an interaction between candidate preference and reported knowledge about the reasons for supporting future candidates. Consistent with this hypothesis, a 2(judge; between) \times 2(target; within) mixed model ANOVA yielded an interaction, $F(1,142) = 34.61, p < .001, \omega^2 = .187$ (and no main effects, $F_s(1, 142) \leq 1.32, p_s \geq .25, \omega^2_s \leq .002$), meaning that Americans claimed to feel more knowledgeable about like (vs. unlike) minded people. Obama voters reported that they felt more knowledgeable about Clinton's than they did about Bush's supporters, and Romney voters reported the opposite pattern (see Table S3).

Table S3. Reported knowledge about why people were supporting Hillary Clinton and Jeb Bush in a future election. Power analyses assume an estimated effect size of $d = 0.46$. ** $p < .001$, *** $p < .001$

| Judge's Vote in 2012 | <i>n</i> | Power | Knowledge about Target, <i>M</i> (<i>SD</i>) | | Simple Effects | |
|----------------------------|----------|-------|---|-------------------------------|------------------|----------|
| | | | Hillary Clinton (D) Supporters | Jeb Bush (R) Supporters | <i>F</i> (1,142) | <i>d</i> |
| Obama (D) | 102 | 99.6% | 65 (22) | 47 (20) | 39.76*** | +0.85 |
| Romney (R) | 43 | 84% | 46 (25) | 59 (19) | 8.67** | -0.59 |

2015 Canada Federal Election. We turned next to see if the same pattern would emerge in the Canadian context. We predicted an interaction between candidate preference and awareness of reasons for supporting future candidates in Canada. Like their southern neighbors, Canadians claimed to be more knowledgeable about people who intended to vote the same (vs. different) way that they did (see Table S4). A 4(judge: Conservative, Liberal, NDP, Undecided; between) \times 2(target; within) mixed model ANOVA yielded an interaction, $F(3,142) = 31.80, p < .001, \omega^2 = .367$ (along with main effects of judge and target, $F_s \geq 5.54, p \leq .001, \omega^2 \geq .048$). Similarly, a 2(judge: Conservative, NDP) \times 2(target) mixed model ANOVA yielded an interaction, $F(1,67) = 87.17, p < .001, \omega^2 = .530$ (and a main effect of target, $F = 7.53, p = .008, \omega^2 = .040$, but no main effect of judge, $F = 0.06, p = .81, \omega^2 < .001$). Both leftist partisans (Liberal & NDP) claimed to better understand the reasons for voting for the left wing NDP leader than the right wing Conservative leader. Conservative partisans displayed the opposite pattern. Undecided voters displayed no difference in their knowledge about the reasons why supporters would vote for either of the two leaders (see Table S4).

Table S4. Reported knowledge about why people plan on voting the way they will in an upcoming federal election in Canada (Study 3). Power analyses assume an estimated effect size of $d = 0.46$. ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

| Judge's Voting Intention | | | Knowledge about Target, <i>M (SD)</i> | | | Contrast | |
|--------------------------|-------------|----------|--|-----------------------|----------------------|-----------------|----------|
| Party Name | Ideology | <i>n</i> | Power | Mulcair Supporters | Harper Supporters | <i>F(1,142)</i> | <i>d</i> |
| Conservative | Right Wing | 28 | 65% | 45 (16) | 64 (18) | 18.27*** | -1.13 |
| Liberal | Center Left | 30 | 68% | 48 (17) | 36 (19) | 8.12** | 0.70 |
| NDP | Left Wing | 41 | 82% | 71 (16) | 36 (16) | 89.81*** | 2.22 |
| (Undecided) | — | 47 | — | 47 (22) | 46 (22) | 0.05 | 0.03 |

Study 4: Multilevel Modeling Analysis

We used multilevel modeling to provide a more powerful test of whether liberals or conservatives are more interested in congenial over uncongenial information. The data pose an analytic challenge: in our previous analyses, we categorized participants as liberal or conservative based on their *stance on a particular issue* (e.g., marijuana legalization). To nest judgments within participants, we require a measure of a person's ideology at the *person level* (not the judgment level). We achieved this by using self-reported political ideology as a person-level predictor. We recoded ideology (-100 to 100 scale) to range from -1 to 1. The outcome variable was a *congeniality score* for each participant on each issue, calculated as the expressed interest in hearing from a like-minded other minus the expressed interest in hearing from an unlike-minded other. We also included several control variables: extremism (the absolute value of ideology), sex (male = -1, female = 1), race (White = 1, all other = -1), age (z-scores), income (z-scores), and education (z-scores).

Table S5 presents the results. In model 1, we entered ideology as a predictor of congeniality scores and found that congeniality scores were positive and significant (evidence of the congeniality bias) but ideology did not predict reported interest in hearing from like-versus-unlike-minded others. In models 2 and 3, we added extremism and demographic variables. The basic result remained unchanged. The only predictor of desires to hear from ideological opponents was a just-significant effect of sex, with females reporting a greater interest to remain in their ideological bubble.

Table S5. Parameter estimates from multilevel models of reports of desires to hear from like-minded others more than the desire to hear from unlike-minded others on seven issues nested within participants. We found robust evidence of the congeniality bias (significant and positive intercept). Liberals and conservatives did not significantly differ in the degree to which they showed the bias.

| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | | Model 3 | |
|-----------|---------------|----------|---------------|----------|---------------|----------|
| | <i>B (SE)</i> | <i>p</i> | <i>B (SE)</i> | <i>p</i> | <i>B (SE)</i> | <i>p</i> |
| Intercept | 34.40 (3.52) | <.001 | 32.89 (6.14) | <.001 | 37.77 (6.40) | <.001 |
| Ideology | -3.52 (6.02) | .56 | -2.94 (6.34) | .64 | -4.35 (6.56) | .51 |
| Extremism | | | 3.30 (10.94) | .76 | -3.38 (11.31) | .77 |
| Sex | | | | | 7.03 (3.47) | .04 |
| Age | | | | | 4.83 (3.13) | .13 |
| Race | | | | | -3.15 (3.94) | .43 |
| Income | | | | | -1.12 (2.96) | .71 |
| Education | | | | | -3.76 (2.94) | .20 |

Study 4b: Boundary Conditions

We examined the boundary conditions of motivated ignorance by testing whether people prefer to not hear from unlike minded people on matters of personal preference and non-moral group-identifying contexts (such as sports).

Method

Participants. The sample was $N = 177$ Americans, recruited as in previous studies. Participants were 49% female and 51% male, 36 years old on average ($SD = 13$), and slightly liberal on average ($M = -8$, $SD = 58$).

Procedure. Participants indicated their stance on several topics, and then indicated their interest in hearing from someone who has the same or different stance.

Topics. Participants responded to seven topics, which appeared in random order between subjects. The topics were (a) aisle or window seats on an airplane, (b) spring or autumn, (c) Coke or Pepsi, (d) watching the National Football League (NFL) or the National Basketball Association (NBA), (e) allowing or prohibiting same-sex marriage, (f) preference for Democrats

or Republicans, and (g) the police having more freedoms or more restrictions. The final three topics were clearly ideological, whereas the first four were less clearly linked to ideology. For each topic, participants chose a side or selected “no preference”. We included in analyses only responses that took a side.

Interest. The question, “How interested are you in each of these activities?” followed by two items worded as: “hear from the typical person who prefers [stance] about why he/she prefers [stance]”. We replaced [stance] for each issue. Participants responded using a slide scale anchored at -100 (*very uninterested*), 0 (*neutral*), and 100 (*very interested*). The slider’s original position was at 0 (*neutral*).

Results

Tables S6 and S7 present descriptive and inferential statistics. We found belief confirmation desires for both ideological issues and personal preferences. To test whether liberals or conservatives express a greater interest in attitudinally congenial information for the various issues, we computed a *congeniality score* for each participant on each issue, calculated as the expressed interest in hearing from a like-minded other minus the expressed interest in hearing from an un-like-minded other. Table S8 shows how ideology was generally uncorrelated with congeniality scores across the various issues. Two exceptions were just significant. Applying a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons, the critical α becomes .007 for specific issues and .025 for the aggregates. Against these criteria, no associations were significant.

Table S6. Participants' reported interest in hearing from like- and unlike-minded others on a variety of Culture War issues and several other, less ideological issues. The like versus unlike contrast statistics represent within-subject planned contrasts, such that positive effects mean that people would rather hear from like- over unlike-minded others. Power analyses assume $d = 0.36$ for the first four (non-political) issues and $d = 0.46$ for the final three (political) issues (Hart et al. 2009). Bolded numbers are statistically significant.

| Issue | Judge's Opinion | | Interest in Hearing from Target who is... <i>M (SD)</i> | | Like vs. Unlike Planned Contrast | | |
|--------------------|-------------------|-------|--|--------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------|-------------|
| | <i>n</i> | Power | | | <i>F</i> | <i>d</i> | |
| Airplane Seat | | | Aisle | Window | | | |
| | Aisle | 30 | 48% | 2 (54) | -6 (58) | 0.81 | 0.28 |
| | Window | 119 | 97% | -8 (50) | 2 (59) | 6.01* | 0.21 |
| Season | | | Spring | Autumn | | | |
| | Spring | 93 | 93% | 25 (51) | 1 (54) | 22.99*** | 0.47 |
| | Autumn | 68 | 83% | 7 (50) | 11 (55) | 5.39* | 0.31 |
| Beverage | | | Coke | Pepsi | | | |
| | Coke | 77 | 88% | 13 (61) | 0 (59) | 18.74*** | 0.45 |
| | Pepsi | 66 | 82% | -14 (59) | 19 (57) | 8.05** | 0.40 |
| Sports League | | | NFL | NBA | | | |
| | NFL | 72 | 85% | 22 (63) | -30 (57) | 50.70*** | 0.82 |
| | NBA | 57 | 76% | 5 (54) | 40 (39) | 18.51*** | 0.58 |
| Same-Sex Marriage | | | Allowed | Prohibited | | | |
| | Allowed | 94 | 99% | 20 (62) | -18 (61) | 38.73*** | 0.65 |
| | Prohibited | 49 | 88% | -27 (67) | 23 (58) | 14.94*** | 0.56 |
| Political Party | | | Democrats | Republicans | | | |
| | Democrats | 77 | 98% | 26 (60) | -15 (65) | 32.65*** | 0.63 |
| | Republicans | 42 | 83% | -21 (65) | 26 (64) | 13.13*** | 0.58 |
| Police Regulations | | | More Restrictions | More Freedom | | | |
| | More Restrictions | 78 | 98% | 42 (48) | 11 (61) | 22.35*** | 0.48 |
| | More Freedom | 46 | 86% | 7 (62) | 32 (55) | 4.90* | 0.41 |

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table S7. Desires to remain within one's information bubble on a variety of Culture War issues and other, less ideological issues. Analyses were 2 (judge: for, against) \times 2 (target: for, against) mixed-model ANOVAs, predicting interest levels. They consistently produced significant interactions, indicating desires for selective exposure on the issue. Recoding the target as congenial vs. uncongenial and re-running the ANOVA routinely yielded a null interaction, meaning that these desires were ideologically symmetric. Controlling for (possible) group differences in ideological extremism in an ANCOVA did little to change the result.

| | For Versus Against | | | | | | Asymmetry Test | | | |
|--------------------|--------------------|-------------|----------|------------|-----------------------|-------------|----------------|------------|----------|------------|
| | Judge | | Target | | Judge \times Target | | ANOVA | | ANCOVA | |
| | <i>F</i> | ω^2 | <i>F</i> | ω^2 | <i>F</i> | ω^2 | <i>F</i> | ω^2 | <i>F</i> | ω^2 |
| Airplane Seat | 0.00 | <.001 | 0.09 | <.001 | 3.63† | .017 | 0.09 | <.001 | 0.11 | <.001 |
| Season | 1.48 | .003 | 1.83 | .004 | 23.82*** | .123 | 1.83 | .004 | 1.89 | .005 |
| Beverage | 1.37 | .003 | 0.75 | <.001 | 25.31*** | .145 | 0.75 | <.001 | 1.27 | .002 |
| Sports League | 10.76** | .070 | 2.31 | .007 | 63.17*** | .321 | 2.31 | .007 | 2.61 | .010 |
| Same-Sex Marriage | 0.45 | <.001 | 0.26 | <.001 | 45.93*** | .239 | 0.26 | <.001 | 0.05 | <.001 |
| Political Party | 0.09 | <.001 | 0.23 | <.001 | 39.81*** | .246 | 0.23 | <.001 | 0.05 | <.001 |
| Police Regulations | 0.12 | <.001 | 1.26 | .002 | 21.49*** | .141 | 1.26 | .002 | 1.10 | .001 |

† $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table S8. Correlations between political ideology and congeniality scores. Congeniality scores were defined as expressed interest toward like-minded others minus expressed interest toward unlike-minded others. Liberals and conservatives were more interested in hearing from like-minded others than hearing from unlike-minded others, and to a similar degree.

| | <i>r</i> | <i>n</i> | <i>p</i> |
|--------------------------------------|-------------|------------|------------|
| Preferences Aggregated | .16 | 175 | .03 |
| Airplane Seat | .12 | 149 | .15 |
| Season | .09 | 161 | .26 |
| Beverage | .10 | 143 | .23 |
| Sports League | .11 | 129 | .21 |
| Ideological Issues Aggregated | -.11 | 167 | .15 |
| Same-Sex Marriage | -.21 | 143 | .01 |
| Political Party | .05 | 119 | .59 |
| Police Regulations | -.14 | 124 | .12 |

Study 5: Factor Analysis of Mediators

Table S9. Results of a factor analysis (with Varimax rotation) of mediator items.

| Item (“Why do you feel that way? Hearing from this person would...”) | Factor | |
|---|-------------|-------------|
| | 1 | 2 |
| ...cause me to feel angry | .195 | .870 |
| ...require a lot of effort on my part | .056 | .782 |
| ...make me feel relaxed (R) | .907 | .010 |
| ...make me feel happy (R) | .911 | .041 |
| ...likely result in a fight | .086 | .885 |
| ...harm my relationship with the speaker | .014 | .866 |
| ...strengthen mutual respect between me and the speaker (R) | .879 | .194 |
| ...build trust between the speaker and me (R) | .899 | .120 |

Summary of Studies

We included all observations in all studies—with two exceptions. First, we did not include data from footnote 5 (Study 3; where the topic was interest in hearing from Marco Rubio and Bernie Sanders supporters) because, at the time of data collection, Sanders was a lesser known Independent, and thus not clearly an ideological opponent of Rubio. Thus, the dyad may not have represented ingroup and outgroup members in participants at the time of data collection.

Including these data in the meta-analysis does not alter the pattern of findings. Second, we did not include data from the non-ideological issues in Study 4b (aisle vs. window, spring vs. autumn, Coke vs. Pepsi, and NFL vs. NBA) because these issues are not ones that necessarily define the Culture War between liberals and conservatives.

Table S10. Data included in the meta-analysis.

| Study | Issue | Liberals | | | Conservatives | | |
|-------|---------------------------------|----------|----------|-----------------------|---------------|----------|-----------------------|
| | | <i>n</i> | <i>d</i> | <i>r_{eq}</i> | <i>n</i> | <i>d</i> | <i>r_{eq}</i> |
| 1 | Same-Sex Marriage | 148 | 0.58 | .27 | 54 | 0.46 | .22 |
| 1 | Same-Sex Marriage (replication) | 172 | 0.45 | .22 | 73 | 0.54 | .26 |
| 2a | Past U.S. Election | 108 | 0.65 | .31 | 48 | 0.95 | .43 |
| 3 | Future U.S Election | 102 | 0.77 | .36 | 43 | 0.74 | .35 |
| 3 | Future Canadian Election | 41 | 1.50 | .60 | 28 | 0.86 | .40 |
| 4a | Marijuana | 82 | 0.45 | .22 | 67 | 0.38 | .19 |
| 4a | Climate Change | 134 | 0.65 | .31 | 29 | 0.24 | .12 |
| 4a | Guns | 93 | 0.48 | .23 | 42 | 0.30 | .15 |
| 4a | Abortion | 83 | 0.42 | .21 | 71 | 0.45 | .22 |
| 4a | Donald Trump | 121 | 0.62 | .30 | 35 | 0.77 | .36 |
| 4a | Bernie Sanders | 63 | 0.30 | .15 | 57 | 0.53 | .26 |
| 4a | Hillary Clinton | 54 | 0.55 | .27 | 90 | 0.58 | .28 |
| 4b | Political Party | 77 | 0.63 | .30 | 42 | 0.58 | .28 |
| 4b | Same-Sex Marriage | 94 | 0.65 | .31 | 49 | 0.56 | .27 |
| 4b | Police Restrictions | 78 | 0.48 | .23 | 46 | 0.41 | .20 |
| 5 | Same-Sex Marriage | 162 | 1.04 | .46 | 74 | 0.96 | .43 |